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IMPLYING A RIGHT OF CONTRIBUTION
UNDER SECTION 10(b) OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
AND RULE 10b-5: THE SUPREME COURT
FINDS POWER WHERE NONE EXISTS
On June 1, 1993, in Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Insurance
of Wausau, the United States Supreme Court finally ended twenty-five
years of uncertainty by holding that defendants in an action under
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange
Act") and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Commission (the
"SEC") have an implied right of action for contribution against others
jointly responsible for violating those provisions.' Despite the uncer-
tainty that previously existed with respect to the existence of an implied
right to contribution, the federal courts, with the approval of the
Supreme Court, have long recognized an implied private cause of
action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 2 In reaching its decision
113 S. Ct. 2085, 2092 (1993).
2 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 & n.16 (1975). A private cause of action was
first implied under § 10(h) and Rule 10b-5 in 1946 when the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania decided Kardan a National Gypsum Company. 69 F. Stipp. 512
(E.D. Pa. 1946).
By its terms, § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") makes it
unlawful for any person:
[do use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security regis-
tered on a national securities exchange or any security nut so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the [Securities and Exchange Commission] may prescribe as neces-
sary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1988) (corresponds to Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch.404, title I, § 10,
48 Stat. 891).
Pursuant to the authority conferred by § 10(b), the Securities and Exchange Commission
(the "SEC") promulgated Rule 106-5 which provides:
It shall be unlawfid for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or any facility of an y
national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992).
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in Musick, the Supreme Court reasoned that because the judiciary had
created the private right of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,
the federal courts have the power to shape the contours of that private
right of action.' In determining that a right of contribution is within
the contours of the section 10(b) action and ancillary to it, the Su-
preme Court reasoned that the federal courts should use their power
to create a right of contribution by making reference to the contribu-
tion provisions contained in other analogous express antifraud sec-
tions of the Exchange Act, and concluded that the 1934 Congress
would have included a right to contribution within the contours of
section 10(b). 4 Moreover, the Supreme Court noted that in the twenty-
five years since the federal courts first implied a right of contribution,
neither the SEC nor the federal courts have suggested that a right to
contribution detracts from the effectiveness of the implied cause of
action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 or that it frustrates the
purposes underlying the federal securities laws. 5
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Musick, a majority of the
lower federal courts and Courts of Appeal had already recognized an
implied right to contribution under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 6
These courts, like the Supreme Court in Musick, view the right to
contribution as ancillary to the implied cause of action under those
provisions and reason, therefore, that because several of the sections
of the federal securities laws that allow for a private cause of action
also contain express provisions for contribution, the same remedy
should be available when liability is based on an implied cause of
3 Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2088-89.
4 ld. at 2090-91 (In attempting to infer how 1934 Congress would have addressed issue of
contribution had right of action under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 been included as express provision
in Exchange Act, Supreme Court analogized to §§ 9 and 18 of Exchange Act which both provide
express provisions for right to contribution).
5 Id, at 2091-92.
6 See Employers ins. of Wausau v. Musick, Peeler & Garrett, 954 F.2d 575, 577 (9th Cir. 1992)
(recognizing established implied right of contribution under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5), cert.
granted, 113 S. Ct. 54 (1992); In re Jif• Lube Sec. Litig., 927 F.2d 155, 160 (4th Cir. 1991) (noting
established right to contribution under § 10(b) and rule 106-5); Smith v. Mulvaney, 827 F.2d 558,
560 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding implied right of contribution exists under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5);
Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 673 F.2d 566, 578 (2d Cir. 1982) (same); Tucker v. Arthur
Anderson & Co., 646 F.2d 721, 727 n.7 (2d Cir. 1981); Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640
F.2d 534, 559 (5th Cir. 1981), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983);
Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 334 (7th Cir. 1979); In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 802 F. Supp.
804, 814-15 (E.D.N,Y. 1992); McCoy v. Goldberg, 778 E Supp. 201, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Baker y.
BP America, Inc., 749 F. Supp. 840, 844 (N.D. Ohio 1990); Globus, Inc. V. Law Research Serv,
Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd per curiae, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied sub nom. Law Research Serv., Inc. v. Blair & Co., 404 U.S. 941 (1971); deHaas v. Empire
Petroleum Co., 286 F Supp. 809, 815-16 (D. Colo. 1968).
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action.'' In addition, these courts in finding an implied right to contri-
bution under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 rely on the fact that such
a right furthers the deterrence policies underlying the federal securi-
ties laws. 8
Despite the great weight of federal authority that recognized an
implied right to contribution prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Musick, there was an emerging minority rule denying such an implied
right." This emerging minority rule was primarily based on the United
States Supreme Court decisions in Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc. and Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union.m
In these cases, the Supreme Court declined to imply a right to contri-
bution under three federal statutes that provided an express private
cause of action for their violation but did not expressly provide for a
right to contribution." The federal courts following this minority rule
reasoned that the analytical framework used in Texas Industries and
Northwest Airlines for determining the existence of an implied right to
contribution precluded them from finding such a right under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without a statutory or federal common law
basis.' 2
 These courts note that the majority of federal court decisions
7 See, e.g., Huddleston, (140 F.2d at 558; Heizer, 601 F.2d at 332; Globus, 318 F. Supp. at 957-58;
deHaas, 286 F. Supp. at 815-16. It appears that Congress, with two exceptions, expressly provided
for a right of contribution under those private action sections where it contemplated the possi-
bility of multiple defendants. See Mark J. Loewenstein, Implied Contribution under the Federal
Securities Laws: A Reassessment, 1982 DUKE L.J. 543, 544. Thus, Congress included the right to
contribution in § 11(f) of the Securities Act of 1933 and in §§ 9(e) and 18(b) of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934, all of which contemplate the possibility of multiple defendants. 15
U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1988); 15 U.S.C. § 78i (e), r(b) (1988). Congress, however, did not provide for
a right of contribution in § 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 and § 20(a) of the Exchange Act of
1934, which also contemplate the possibility of multiple defendants. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1988); 15
U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1988).
8
 See, e.g., Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 559; Heizer, 601 E2d at 332; Globus, 318 F. Stipp. at 958;
Baker v. BP America, Inc., 749 F. Supp. 840, 843 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
• See, e.g., Chutich v. Touche Ross Sc Co., 960 E2d 721, 723-24 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding no
right to contribution under § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5); First Fin. Say. Bank v. American Bankers Ins.
Co., [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) If 94,824, at 94,447 (E.D.N.C. 1989);
Robin v, Doctors Oilicenters Corp., 730 F. Supp. 122, 125 (N.D. Ill. 1989); In re Professional Fin.
Management, Ltd., 683 E Stipp. 1283, 1286 (D. Minn. 1988).
19 Texas Indus., Inn. v Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981); Northwest Airlines, Inc.
v. Transport Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 451 U.S. 77 (1981).
II See Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 646 (holding no implied right of contribution under Sherman
and Clayton Acts); Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 98 (holding no implied right of contribution
or federal common law right to contribution under federal Equal Pay Act or Title VII).
12
 See, e.g., Chutich v. Touche Ross & Co., 960 F.2d 721, 723 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding absent
statutory or federal common law basis, federal courts are powerless to create right of contribution
under § 10(h) and Rule 101)-5); Robin, 730 F. Supp. at 125 (holding no private cause of action
for contribution may be implied under Rule 10b-5).
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that found an implied right to contribution predated the Supreme
Court's decisions in Texas Industries and Northwest Airlines and there-
fore failed to address the threshold question of whether the federal
courts have the power to imply such a right.' 3
Facing the uncertainty surrounding the existence of an implied
right of contribution under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the United
States Supreme Court finally seized the opportunity to resolve the
matter when it granted certiorari to hear Musick, Peeler & Garrett u
Employers Insurance of Wausau." As noted above, the Supreme Court
in Musick held that the federal courts do have the power to imply a
right of contribution under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5." In so
holding, the Supreme Court adopted the reasoning of the majority of
federal courts that had previously found that such a right exists and
rejected the emerging minority rule that had denied such a right."
Thus, by holding that an implied right to contribution exists under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the Supreme Court distinguished Texas
Industries and Northwest Airlines and thereby declined to apply the
analytical framework adopted in those decisions.'
This Note examines the disparity that existed in the federal courts
prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Musick, with respect to the
availability of an implied right of contribution under section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5. Acknowledging that this disparity
was primarily created by the Supreme Court's decisions in Texas Indus-
tries and Northwest Airlines, the Note concludes by arguing that the
Supreme Court erred in Musick by refusing to adopt the analysis
applied in those decisions and, therefore, improperly found that the
federal courts have the power to imply a right of contribution. Section
I provides a brief overview of the right to contribution and how it has
developed under the law." Section II surveys earlier federal court
decisions finding an implied right of contribution under section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 and the basis employed by those courts in finding such
a right. 19 Section III addresses the analytical framework adopted in
Texas Industries and Northwest Airlines for implying a private right of
action, namely contribution, under federal statutes. 2° Section IV exam-
15 See Chulich, 960 F.2d at 722-23; In re Professional Fin. Management, 683 F. Supp. 1283,
1287 & n.7 (D. Minn. 1988).
14 See Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 113 S. Ct. 54 (1992).
15 See Musidi, 113 S. Ct_ at 2086,2092.
16 See id. at 2091-92.
17 See id. at 2087-88.
18 See infra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
IS See infra notes 33-77 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 78-123 and accompanying text.
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ines the uncertain status of an implied right of contribution under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 that existed following Texas Industries and
Northwest Airlines and prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Mu-
sick. 2 ' Section V analyzes the Supreme Court's decision in Musick that
ended the uncertainty surrounding an implied right to contribution. 22
Section VI analyzes the power of federal courts to create a right of
contribution among violators of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 23 Finally,
this section concludes by arguing that it is improper for the federal
courts to create such a right, primarily because there is no statutory or
federal common law basis for doing so, and argues that the Supreme
Court erred in Musick by refusing to apply the analysis adopted in Texas
Industries and Northwest Airlines when it held that defendants in an
action under section 10(b) and Rule 1 Ob-5 have an implied right to
contribution against those jointly responsible for violating those provi-
sions.24
I. AN OVERVIEW OF CONTRIBUTION
Contribution is a doctrine founded upon the principles of equity
and arises where two or more parties are liable to the same plaintiff
for the same remedy. 25
 Typically, a right to contribution is recognized
where one of multiple joint tortfeasors has discharged the shared
liability on behalf of the others or has paid more than his or her
proportionate share. 26
 Thus, contribution refers to the right of the
discharging party to recover from the other joint tortfeasors that por-
tion of the damages for which they are responsible. 27 Such a right
reflects the rationale that when two or more parties share responsibility
for a wrong, it would be inequitable for one of the parties to absorb
the entire liability, and furthers the policy of deterring all wrongdoers
by reducing their chances of escaping liability entirely. 25
21 See infra notes 124-244 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 245-307 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 308-347 and accompanying text.
24
 See infra notes 308-347 and accompanying text.
25 See, e.g., 18 Am. JuR. 2D Contribution § 1 (1985); 18 C.J.S. Contribution § 2 (1990).
26 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or TouTs § 886A chin. b (1982).
27 See, e.g., 18 Am. km. 21) Contribution § 1 (1985); 18 C.J.S. Contribution § 2 (1991). It is
significant to note that contribution is distinguishable from indemnification. See David S. Ruder,
Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto,
Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597, 647 (1972). According to Professor
Ruder, indemnification "entails shifting the entire loss from one tortfeasor who has been com-
pelled to pay it to another who, for equitable reasons, should beat' it instead. In essence,
contribution results in a sharing of the burden, whereas indemnity results in shifting it" Id.
28 See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, 451 U.S.
77, 88 (1981).
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At early common law, the courts refused to allow a right to con-
tribution among joint tortfeasors. 24' Despite the common law rule, the
majority of states today have enacted statutes permitting contribution
among tortfeasors in various situations, and in some jurisdictions the
common law rule has been changed by judicial decision." One com-
mentator has pointed out that while the trend in American jurisdic-
tions has been toward favoring contribution, this trend has been gen-
erally limited to negligent torts.st That commentator notes that where
a party's conduct has been found to be reckless, intentional or fraudu-
lent, that party has generally not been entitled to contribution."
II. EARLY COURT DECISIONS ESTABLISHING AN IMPLIED RIGHT TO
CONTRIBUTION UNDER SECTION 10(b) AND RULE 10b-5
The express terms of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule
10b-5 do not provide for a private right of action for their violation."
As early as 1946, however, the federal courts have implied such a right. 34
This implied right of action has become a firmly established remedy
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and has been approved and
upheld by the United States Supreme Court." In addition, many early
federal court decisions recognized this implied right of action, and
have also implied a right of contribution under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5. 36
25 See Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 Term. Rep. 186, 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337, 1337 (K.B. 1799).
While Merryweather created the common law rule of no-contribution, it has been interpreted as
only barring contribution in cases of intentional wrongdoing. See, e.g., Northwest Airlines, 451
U.S. at 86 n.16.
"See RESTATEMENT(SECOND) oe 'Fouls § 886A (1982). The Restatement notes that eighty
percent of the states recognize the right of contribution and no longer follow the early common
law rule. Id. Although the change in most of the states has come about through legislative
enactment, about a third of the jurisdictions now recognizing contribution have done so through
judicial decision. Id.
31 Loewenstein, supra note 7, at 556. See also Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors (1955
Revised Act) § 1(c) ("There is no right to contribution in favor of any tortfeasor who has
intentionally ... caused or contributed to the injury . . ."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS
§ 886A cmt- j (1982), which notes jurisdiction denying contribution to intentional tortfeasors.
32 Loewenstein, supra note 7, at 556.
33 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992). See also supra note 2.
34 See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (first case to
recognize private damage suit under § 10(b) of Exchange Act).
35 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976) (Supreme Court noted existence
of private cause of action under § 10(b) of Exchange Act and Rule 106-5 has been continually
recognized by federal courts and such right is well established).
36 See, e.g., Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 558-59 (5th Cir. 1981); Heizer
Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 334 (7th Cir. 1979); Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 318 F.
Supp. 955, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809, 815-16 (D.
Colo. 1968).
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The first court to directly address the issue of a right to contribu-
don under Rule 10b-5 was the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado in its 1968 decision, deHaas v. Empire Petroleum
Co." The court in deHaas implied a right to contribution in favor of a
defendant whose liability was based on the implied right of action
under section 10(b). 58
 The plaintiffs in deHaas alleged that the defen-
dants obtained consent to a corporate merger through the use of false
and misleading proxy solicitations in violation of Rule 10b-5. 39 The
defendants filed a third-party complaint against their legal counsel
seeking indemnification and contribution claiming that he assisted in
preparing the allegedly fraudulent proxies and that he had a duty to
make the proper disclosures.'" In finding that there was an implied
right of action for contribution, the deHaas court noted that while
section 10(b) does not expressly provide for contribution, civil liability
under that section has been implied by the courts."t The court rea-
soned that because other express civil liability provisions in both the
Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act") and the Exchange Act
typically provide for contribution, contribution should be implied
when the underlying liability has been implied, as in section 10(b).42
Similarly, two years after deHaas was decided, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York, in Globus, Inc. v.
Law Research Service ("Globus If'), held that contribution was available
to defendants found jointly and severally liable for violations of sections
12(2) and 17(a) of the Securities Act and section 10(b) of the Ex-
change Act." The court in Globus II, recognizing that the general trend
in the law had been toward the allowance of contribution among joint
tortfeasors, ordered that two defendants pay their proportionate share
of liability to a third defendant who had already discharged the entire
liability." As part of the basis for its holding, the Globus II court relied
57 286 F. Supp. 809 (D. Colo. 1968). See also In re Olympia. Brewing Co. Securities Litigation,
674 F. Supp. 597, 614 (N.D. III. 1987) (noting dellaas was first case to address issue of contribution
in federal securities case).
ss deHaas, 286 E Supp. at 815-16.
35 /d. at 811-12.
4° Id. at 815.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 815-16 ("Since the specific liability provisions of the Act provide fir contribution, it
appears that contribution should be permitted when liability is implied under Section 10(b).").
See also Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 9, 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78i, r (1988) (both of which contain
express civil liability and contribution); Securities Act of 1933, § 11 (1) , 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1988)
(providing for express civil liability and contribution).
43
 318 F. Supp. 955, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) [hereinafter Globus
	 Globus I was the predecessor
case. See Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
44 318 F. Stipp. at 957, 958.
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on the reasoning in &Haas, noting that the analogy of express provi-
sions in the securities acts to implied rights of action "is simply a
pertinent application of the general principle that the two statutes are
to be administered in pan materia."45 Construing section 10(b) to-
gether with the express liability provisions in other sections of the
federal securities laws, the court determined that a right of action for
contribution should be implied under section 10(b)."
A second rationale adopted by the Globus II court in finding an
implied right of contribution was that such a right would further the
deterrent policies underlying the federal securities laws. 47 The court
reasoned that the same ground for disallowing indemnification under
the federal securities laws could be applied for allowing a right of
contribution." The court noted that allowing a defendant indemnifica-
tion and, thus, complete absolution from liability "dilutes the impact
of the securities laws, which seek 'to encourage diligence, investigation
and compliance with the requirements of the statute by exposing
issuers and underwriters to the substantial hazard of liability for com-
pensatory damages.'"" Denying contribution, the court reasoned,
would have the same effect of diluting these deterrent policies, because
those non-contributing defendants would escape liability completely,
and leave the entire burden to be borne by their joint defendants who
have been more prompt and diligent. 50
Other federal courts considering the question of an implied right
of contribution under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 have determined
that the availability of such a right is a matter of federal common law.''
In making this determination, at least one of these courts has expressly
dismissed the analytical inquiry of whether the federal courts even have
the power to infer such a right, noting that this inquiry has already
been made in implying a private right of action under section 10(b)
45 Globus II, 318 F. Supp. at 958.
46 14 The United States Supreme Court has noted that the Securities Act of 1933 and
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are interrelated components of the federal regulatory scheme
and that the interdependence of the different sections Is certainly a relevant factor in any
interpretation of the language Congress has chosen ...." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 206 (1976) (quoting SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 466 (1969)).
47 See Globus II, 318 F. Supp. at 958.
48 1d.
49 1d. (quoting Globus v. Law Research Serv„ Inc., 418 F.2d 1286, 1289 (1969)).
50 Id at 958.
51 See, e.g., Huddleston v. Herman & Maclean, 640 F.2d 539, 557 (5th Cir. 1981) (because
action under Rule 1013-5 is implied under federal statute, right to contribution under Rule 10b-5
is determined by federal law); Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 331 (7th Cir. 1979) (availability
of contribution under federal securities laws is matter of federal law and matter of federal
common law where availability is implied).
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and Rule 10b-5.52
 These courts, like the court in Globus II, note that
although the common law rule does not recognize a right to contribu-
tion among intentional joint tortfeasors, the underlying policies of the
federal securities laws are reinforced by allowing contribution." More-
over, these courts invoke an additional rationale for allowing contribu-
tion by noting that fundamental fairness requires that losses caused by
joint wrongdoers be apportioned among them. 54
Following the precedents in deHaas and Globus II, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Heizer Carp. v. Ross,
also held that a right of contribution was available under Rule 10b-5
and acknowledged that judicial implication of this right under section
10(b) was a matter of federal common law." Heizer involved claims of
contribution and indemnification against a former chief executive
officer and director of a corporation that had been held liable under
Rule 10b-5." Although in 1975, the United States Supreme Court, in
Cort v. Ash, set out a four-part test for determining whether to imply a
private cause of action under a federal statute, the Heizer court ex-
pressly declined to apply this test.57 The Heizer court simply noted that
application of the Cart test was unnecessary to find an implied right of
contribution under Rule 10b-5 because the test had already been
successfully applied in finding an implied civil right of action under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5." The court reasoned that contribution
is ancillary to this implied civil remedy and furthers the same policy
considerations. 59
 Noting that an implied private cause of action under
52
 See Heizer, 601 F.2d at 333 n.6 (finding it unnecessary, with respect to contribution under
§ 10(6) and Rule 10b-5, to apply analysis developed by the Supreme Court to determine whether
private remedy is implicit in statute not expressly providing for it).
53
 See, e.g., HuddlesIon, 640 F.2d at 557, 559; Heizer, 601 F.2d at 331-32.
54
 See, e.g., Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 559; Heizer, 601 F.2d at 332, 333,
55 601 F.2d 330, 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1979),
56 Heizer 601 F.2d at 330-31.
57 1d, at 333 n.6. The four factors set forth by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash in determining
whether a private remedy may be implied under a federal statute that does not expressly provide
for one were: (1) whether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose especial benefit Congress
enacted the statute; (2) whether there is any explicit or implicit legislative intent, either to create
or deny a remedy; (3) whether the desired remedy was consistent with the underlying purposes
of the legislative scheme; and (4) whether the cause of action is one traditionally governed by
state law so that it would be improper to infer a federal remedy. 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
58 Heizer, 601 F.2d at 333 n.6. But see Robin v. Doctors Officenters Corp., 730 F. Supp. 122,
123 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (noting once court implies right of action, it has broad Flexibility in deter-
mining remedies available under cause of action; when remedy creates independent substantive
rights, such as contribution, however, courts must apply same standard used to imply any other
private right of action).
59 Heizer, 601 F.2d at 333 n.6.
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Rule 10b-5 is well established, the Heizer court concluded that an
implied right of contribution should necessarily follow."
Moreover, the court in Heizer, echoing the reasoning in deHaas,
indicated that the rule allowing an implied right of contribution finds
further support in that of the seven express civil remedies under the
federal securities laws, three expressly provide for contribution. 61 The
court noted that this indicates Congress's desire to allow contribution
when it expressly provided for a civil cause of action that might involve
joint' tortfeasors. 62 The Heizer court concluded that "[i]nasmuch as
three specific liability provisions include the remedy of contribution,
that ancillary remedy should be implied when the remedy itself has
been implied as under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5."63
Noting that private remedies may be implied under the federal
securities laws, the Heizer court went on to address the deterrence and
fairness justifications for allowing contribution in section 10(b) cases. 64
The Heizer court concluded that apportioning the loss among joint
tortfeasors, even intentional tortfeasors, will ensure that all culpable
parties feel the deterrent effect of judgment and that plaintiffs will
have a broader source of reimbursement." The court further noted
that justice is more equally distributed by improving the common law
rule against contribution that permits a plaintiff to force one of two
wrongdoers to bear the entire loss, while the other was equally or more
at fault.66
Similarly, in 1981, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, in Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, held that the rule allow-
ing contribution under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is an equitable
result that achieves the deterrence that underlies the federal securities
laws.° The Huddleston court acknowledged that the courts have tradi-
tionally denied contribution to intentional tortfeasors, insofar as courts
should not aid those who deliberately do harm, and that denying such
a shift in the loss to other fraud participants may create an even greater
deterrent to violating Rule 10b-5. 68 The court noted, however, that
these reasons do not take into account the possibility that denying
69 Id. at 331-32, 334.
fit Id at 332.
62 id
63 Id
64 Heizer, 601 F.2d at 332, 333.
65 /d at 332.
66 /d
67 640 F.2d 534, 559 (5th Cir. 1981).
" Id. at 557-58.
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contribution does not deter those co-conspirators that are unlikely to
be named as defendants in a Rule 10b-5 action. 66 In fact, such a
co-conspirator, the court noted, may be deterred by the prospect of
complete liability or encouraged by the possibility that another co-con-
spirator will be the only one sued and therefore be responsible for the
en tire fault."
The Huddleston court also noted that a "no-contribution rule"
would promote an undesirable rush to settlement." The court indi-
cated that the common law rule precluding contribution among inten-
tional joint tortfeasors developed before the modern concept of multi-
party litigation involving enormous monetary claims and litigation
costs. 72
 The court noted that the disallowance of contribution in such
a context would promote:
. .. a rush to settlement whereby certain defendants can
purchase freedom from litigation and the ultimate court
judgment, simultaneously providing the plaintiffs with funds
to finance the continuation of the suit against the non-settling
defendants. Moreover, the settling defendants may well extri-
cate themselves from litigation in exchange for small settle-
ment amounts, leaving the non-settling defendants to bear a
much larger liability in the form of the final court judgment."
The Huddleston court indicated that such a no-contribution rule
would allow plaintiffs to play one defendant against another in the
hopes that some will settle." Furthermore, the court noted that
although the law favors compromise Over litigation, the type of
settlement that a no-contribution rule would promote neither ter-
minates litigation nor fosters efficient court administration."
As the foregoing discussion indicates, even prior to the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Insur-
ance of Wausau wherein the Court finally recognized an implied right
to contribution, these and other earlier decisions established a majority
rule recognizing the availability of an implied right of contribution for
parties jointly liable for violating section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 7s Two
0
 Id. at 558.
70 Id.
71 Id.




76 113 S. Ct. 2085, 2092 (1993). See infra notes 245-307 and accompanying text.
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subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court and an emerging minority
rule denying such a right, however, began to call this majority rule into
question and created uncertainty among the federal courts as to the
existence of an implied right of contribution under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5."
III. CONTRIBUTION AS AN IMPLIED RIGHT UNDER THE SUPREME
COURT'S ANALYSIS IN NORTHWEST AIRLINES AND TEXAS INDUSTRIES
It has been pointed out by at least one court that the recognition
of an implied right of contribution under the federal securities laws
has been judicially developed without the courts addressing an impor-
tant threshold question: whether federal courts have the power to
create a right of action for contribution in the absence of congressional
intent.78
 Where a statute does not expressly provide for a particular
right of action, such as contribution, a federal court must construe that
statute to determine if it implies such a right. 7' If an implied right of
action cannot be determined through statutory construction, a federal
court may then look to the limited area of federal common law."
As has already been noted, the Supreme Court, in Cart v. Ash,
established a foUr-factor test in order to determine whether to imply a
private cause of action under a federal statute. 81 The Supreme Court
in formulating this test outlined the following inquiry:
First, is the plaintiff 'one of the class for whose especial
benefit the statute was enacted,' . . . . Second, is there any
indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to
create such a remedy or to deny one?  Third, is it con-
sistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme
to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? . . . . And finally, is
the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in
an area basically the concern of the states, so that it would be
inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on fed-
eral law?"
77 See, e.g., Chutich v. Touche Ross & Co., 960 F.2d 721, 722, 723-24 (8th Cir. 1992); In re
Professional Fin. Management, 683 E Supp. 1283, 1286 (D. Minn. 1988).
78 Chutich, 960 F.2d at 722.
78 See Texas Indus., Inc. V. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981); Northwest
Airlines V. Transport Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, 451 U.S. 77, 91 (1981).
88
 See Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 640 (Court considered limited area of federal common law
only after examining statutory language); Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 94-95 (after reviewing
statutory construction, Court turned to federal common law).
81 See Cori v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
82
 Id. at 78.
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Although the Supreme Court continues to apply these factors, it has
done so in a more restrictive manner. 83 The Court has made it clear
that the second factor of the Cort test, congressional intent, has
become the principle focus in implying a private right of action
under a federal statute."
Since the court in Heizer expressly declined to apply the Cort test
in finding an implied right of contribution under section 10(b), the
Supreme Court has applied the modified Cort test, focusing on con-
gressional intent, in trying to determine an implied right to contribu-
tion under other federal statutes." In May 1981, in Northwest Airlines,
Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, the Court held that there
was no right to contribution under the Equal Pay Act of 1963 or Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 86 Similarly, one month later, the
Court, in Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., found no
implied right to contribution under the Sherman and Clayton Acts. 87
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Musick, it had been noted
that the analysis in these two cases could also be applied to claims for
contribution under the federal securities laws thereby restricting the
implication of such claims."
In Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union of America, the
United States Supreme Court denied an employer's claim for contri-
bution under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act."
This case was brought by Northwest Airlines after judgment was en-
tered against it in a class action brought against Northwest Airlines by
female flight attendants." In this class action, Northwest was held liable
to the class for back pay because wage differentials between male and
female flight attendants were found to violate the Equal Pay Act of
1963 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Subsequently,
Northwest brought a separate action against the Transport Workers
Union of America AFL-CIO seeking contribution on the theory that
the wage differentials were embodied in the collective bargaining
agreement."
83 See Robin v. Doctors Officenters Corp., 730 F. Supp. 122, 123 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
84 See King v. Gibbs, 876 F.2d 1275, 1280-81 (7th Cir. 1989) (describing recent pronounce-
ments of Supreme Court applying more restrictive reading of Cart test).
85
 See Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 639-40; Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 91.
88 451 U.S. 77, 98 (1981).
87
 451 U.S. 630, 646 (1981).
BB See Chutich V. Touche Ross & Co., 960 F.2d 721, 722 (8th Cir. 1992); In re Professional Fin.
Management, 683 F. Supp. 1283, 1285 (D. Minn. 1988).
89 Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 98.
9° See Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 763 (D.D.C. 1973), affd in part, vacated
and remanded in part, 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
91 Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 81.
92 M at 80-81.
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Because neither the Equal Pay Act nor Title VII provide for an
express right of contribution, the •Court had to determine whether
such a right could be implied under the statute or, in the alternative,
whether it could create a right of contribution as a matter of federal
common law." Focusing first on whether contribution could be im-
plied, the Court noted that the ultimate inquiry was whether Congress
intended to create the private remedy. 94 The Court invoked the Cart
factors as a means to determine if the requisite congressional intent
surrounded the statute."
The Court first noted that Northwest, as an employer, did not fall
within the class for whose "especial benefit" the Equal Pay Act or Title
VII were enacted." In fact, the Court determined that these statutes
were expressly directed against employers for the benefit of employ-
ees. 97 Furthermore, the Court found that there was a comprehensive
remedial scheme embodied in the statutes, and that such a scheme
indicates Congress's intent not to authorize additional remedies." Fi-
nally, the Court found that there was nothing in the legislative histories
of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII to indicate that Congress had
considered whether contribution should be available to violators of
those acts.99 The Court concluded that unless congressional intent to
create a right of action can be inferred from the language or structure
of the statute, or from some other source, there is no predicate for
implying a private remedy.'" Thus, because the Court was unable to
find any manifestation of intent by Congress to create a right to
contribution under the statutes, no such right should be implied.m
Having found that a right to contribution could not be implied
under the statutes, the Court next addressed the power of a federal
court to create such a right under federal common law.'" The Court
noted that federal courts have limited law making power and that
"federal common law is 'subject to the paramount authority of Con-
gress.'"°3 The very limited areas in which the Court recognized the
power of the federal courts to fashion federal common law were those
93
 Id. at 91, 95.
94 1d. at 91.
95 M.
96 Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 92.
97 id,
98 Id. at 93-94.
99 Id at 94.
1 ° 1 Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 94-95.
1 °2 14 at 95.
105 Id. (quoting New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336,348 (1931)).
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areas raising issues of uniquely federal concerns, such as the rights and
obligations of the United States, interstate disputes and admiralty
cases.m Given the paramount authority of Congress, the Court con-
cluded that where Congress has enacted such a comprehensive legis-
lative scheme, the absence of a remedy can be presumed to be delib-
erate. 1 °5 In the Court's view, both the Equal Pay Act and Title VII were
such schemes; therefore, the federal courts may not "fashion new
remedies that might upset carefully considered legislative programs." 106
In view of its analysis, the Court held that it would be improper to add
a right to contribution to the statutory rights already provided for by
Congress under the statutes.'"
Similarly, one month after its decision in Northwest Airlines, the
United States Supreme Court, in Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Mate-
rials, held that there was no implied right to contribution under the
federal antitrust laws.'°8 Applying the same analysis it had adopted in
Northwest Airlines, the Court concluded that a right to contribution
could neither be implied nor created by the federal courts under the
Sherman and Clayton Acts.'°' The Court determined that there was
nothing in the legislative history or statutory scheme of the Sherman
and Clayton Acts to indicate Congress's intent to allow contribution in
antitrust actions."' Furthermore, the Court found that the petitioner
seeking contribution was not a member of the class that the statute was
intended to benefit, noting that the antitrust laws "were not adopted
for the benefit of the participants in a conspiracy to restrain trade. ”111
The Court concluded, therefore, that Congress did not intend to imply
a right of contribution under these laws."'
The Court then considered whether a right of contribution could
be judicially created under federal common law."' As it had done in
Northwest Airlines, the Court indicated again that the power of federal
courts to fashion federal common law is very limited, especially absent
some congressional authorization to formulate substantive rules of
decision."4 The Court indicated that contribution among antitrust
1°4 Id.
1113 Id. at 97.
106 Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 97.
167 /d. at 98.
1 °6 451 U.S. 630, 646 (1981).
1 °9 /d. at 640, 645.
11 ° Id. at 639.
2 " Id.
112 Id. at 640.
113 Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 640.
114 /d. at 641.
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wrongdoers does not fall into any of the narrow categories that have
been recognized as appropriate for the development of a federal com-
mon law."5 Moreover, the Court noted that there is no indication that
Congress intended to empower the federal courts to formulate reme-
dies to enforce the provisions of the antitrust laws.' 16 The Court rea-
soned, instead, that the comprehensiveness of the legislative scheme
indicates a presumption that any remedy not specifically mentioned
was deliberately omitted by Congress." 7 Accordingly, the Court also
concluded that the federal courts are powerless to create a right of
contribution under the Sherman or Clayton Acts.'"
In the course of its decisions in Northwest Airlines and Texas Indus-
tries, wherein it was analyzing federal statutes containing express pri-
vate rights of action, the Supreme Court did not address whether there
is an implied right of contribution when the underlying liability is
based on an implied right of action.' 19 In fact, as one lower court noted,
it appears that the Supreme Court had expressly reserved judgment
on the applicability of the analysis it advanced in Northwest Airlines and
Texas Industries to contribution cases under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5.' 2° Moreover, the Supreme Court in both Northwest Airlines and
Texas Industries declined to comment on the policy considerations that
the petitioners advanced in each case for allowing a right of contribu-
tion.' 2 ' The validity of these considerations, the Court noted, are a
matter for Congress to resolve, not the courts. 122 As Section V discusses,
the Supreme Court in Musick eventually declined to apply the analysis
set forth in Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries to an implied right
of contribution under section 10(b) and Rule 101)-5 by noting that
those cases were distinguishable because they involved federal statutes
that contained an express private cause of action.'"
IV. AN IMPLIED RIGHT TO CONTRIBUTION AFTER NORTHWEST
AIRLINES AND TkXAS INDUSTRIES BUT PRIOR TO MUSICK
After Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries were decided and
before the Musick decision, a number of lower courts faced the issue
115 M at 642.
116 Id at 643-44.
"7 M at 645.
118 Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 646.
119 See id. at 640 n.11; Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 91 n.24.
12° See Baker v. BP America, Inc., 749 F. Supp. 840, 844 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
121 See Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 646-47; Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 98 n.41.
122 See Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 646-47; Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 98 n.41.
123 See infra notes 245-307 and accompanying text.
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of whether an implied right of contribution is available under section
10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5.' 24 Although some of these
courts continued to imply a right to contribution by adopting the
"policy approach" of earlier courts, a minority rule began to emerge
denying such a right.' 25 This minority view was based primarily on the
analysis the Supreme Court adopted in Northwest Airlines and Texas
Industfies.' 26 These courts refused to create an implied right of contri-
bution under section 10(b) and Rule 101)-5 in the absence of congres-
sional intent to do so.' 21
A. Cases still finding an Implied Right to Contribution under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5
Many of the cases decided after Northwest Airlines and Texas In-
dustries that continued to imply a right to contribution under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 simply followed earlier precedent without con-
sidering or applying the analysis adopted in these Supreme Court
decisions.' 28 Some of these cases, however, addressed Northwest Airlines
and Texas Industries, but found these decisions distinguishable, and
continued to look to the policies of deterrence and fairness in implying
a right of contribution. 129`
 In addition, at least one court adopting the
analysis in Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries questioned the judi-
cial power to imply contribution, but upheld the right as precedent
required.'"
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision to grant certiorari in Mu-
sick, other courts also continued to follow earlier precedent, noting
that the Supreme Court had previously denied certiorari to cases
finding an implied right of contribution, and therefore, had not yet
124 see, e.g., ankh v. Touclic Ross & Co., 960 F.2d 721, 724 (8th Cir. 199'2) (no implied
right of contribution); In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 802 F. Supp. 804, 814-15 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)
(finding implied right of contribution based on precedent); McCoy v. Goldberg, 778 F. Supp.
201, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding implied right of contribution); Baker, 749 F, Stipp. at 844
(same); Robin v. Doctors Officenters Corp., 730 E Stipp. 122, 125 (N.D. III. 1989) (no implied
right of contribution).
125 See, e.g., Chutich, 960 F.2d at. 724; Crazy Eddie, 802 F. Supp. at 814-15; McCoy, 778 F. Supp.
at 203; Baker, 749 F. Stipp. at 844; Robin, 730 E Supp. at 125.
126 See, e.g., Chutich, 960 F.2d at 723; Robin, 730 F. Supp. at 125; In re Professional Fin.
Management, 683 F. Stipp. 1283, 1285-86 (D. Minn. 1988),
121 See, e.g., Chutich, 960 F.2d at 723-24; Robin, 730 F. Supp. at 125.
128 See, e.g., Smith v. Mulvaney, 827 E2d 558, 560 (9tb Cir. 1987); Sirota v. Solitron Devices,
Inc., 673 F.2d 566, 578 Mt Cir. 1982), cert. denier4 459 U.S. 838 (1982); McCoy, 778 F. Supp. at
203.
129 See, e.g., Baker, 749 F. Supp. at 842-44; Seiler v. E.F, Hutton, 102 F.R.D. 880, 885-86 (D.N.J,
1984). See also Noonan v. Granville, 532 F. Supp. 1007, 1008 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
' 50 See In re Olympia Brewing Co. Sec. Litig., 674 F. Supp. 597, 616 (N.D. III. 1987).
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restricted contribution rights under the federal securities laws. 13' Thus,
in September 1992, in In re Crazy Eddie Securities Litigation, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York allowed a
claim for contribution under section 10(b) based on the fact that the
controlling Second Circuit case, Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc., decided
after Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries, also held there was an
implied right of contribution.' 32 The court in Crazy Eddie noted that
although Sirota did not recognize the Supreme Court decisions, the
Supreme Court subsequently denied certiorari and the Second Circuit
has not since disavowed any of its analysis in Sirota.'" Accordingly, the
court in Crazy Eddie, acknowledging that Sirota remains the law in the
Second Circuit, held that contribution was available under section
10 (b) . 134
Similarly, in 1981, the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia, in In re National Student Marketing Litigation, concluded
that because the Supreme Court in Northwest Airlines and Texas Indus-
tries expressly declined to comment on the availability of contribution
under the federal securities laws, it had not yet restricted the implica-
tion of such a right. 135 Moreover, the National Student Marketing court
observed that the Supreme Court declined an opportunity to do so
when it denied certiorari to Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Harwath
v. Harwitch,' 36 which was decided several months after Texas Indus-
tries. 137 The court in National Student Marketing reasoned that the
Id] enial of certiorari in the Laventhol case leaves the lingering as-
sumption that rights of contribution may be implied under § 10(b) . "138
Consequently, the National Student Marketing court concluded that this
"lingering assumption" gives the federal courts the power to imply such
a remedy and indicates that Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries did
not overrule any previous implication of a right to contribution under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 13`t)
131 See, e.g., In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 802 F. Supp. 804, 814-15 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); In re
National Student Mkt. Litig., 517 F. Stipp. 1345, 1349 (D.D.C. 1981).
132 Crazy Eddie, 802 F. Supp. at 814 (citing Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 673 F.2d 566 (2d
Cir. 1982)).
1 3 Id. al 814-15.
154 id, at 815.
11-5 National Student Mkt., 517 F. Stipp. al 1348-49.
136 Id at 1349 (citing Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath v. Horwitch, 637 F.2d 672
(9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3114 (1981)).
137 m
138 m
13'-' See id. at. 1348-49.
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The basis for the decision in In re National Student Marketing,
however, was called into question in 1987, when the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois decided In re Olympia
Brewing Go. Securities Litigation.'" The Olympia Brewing court stated
that it is well established that the Supreme Court's views on the merits
of a case cannot be implied when the Court denies a petition for
certiorari on that case."' Furthermore, the court in Olympia Brewing
noted that the two footnotes in Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries,
wherein the Supreme Court stated that it expressed no view as to
contribution in federal securities cases, were not an indication of the
Court's approval of such a right. 142 Consequently, the Olympia Brewing
court declined to adopt the reasoning that National Student Marketing
used to find judicial authority for creating a right of contribution
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 143
Nevertheless, the Olympia Brewing court went on to determine
whether the federal courts do in fact have the power to create a right of
indemnification and contribution under the federal securities laws.' 44
in making this determination the Olympia Brewing court focused on
congressional intent, thereby employing the same analysis used in
Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries.'" Although the court recog-
nized the lack of judicial power to imply a right of action for indem-
nification under section 10(b), the court continued to imply a right of
contribution, noting that it was bound by precedent.' During its
analysis, the Olympia Brewing court stated that there is a strong pre-
sumption against the creation of private rights of action by implica-
tion."' The court observed that federal courts should exercise judicial
restraint and that federal lawmaking power is vested in Congress. 148
Moreover, the Olympia Brewing court explained that this is especially
true when it comes to the federal securities laws because the "Supreme
Court repeatedly has admonished the federal courts to pay greater
attention to legislative intent when the courts interpret the liability
sections of the securities laws."149
140 674 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. ill. 1957).
141 1d. at 615.
142 Id.
140 Id.
1" See id. at 612, 615.
145 Olympia Brewing. 674 F, Supp. at 612, 615.
146 Id. at 613, 616.
147 Id. at 609.
148 1d. at 612.
149 Id.
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In addressing whether the judiciary has the authority to create or
imply a right of contribution, the Olympia Brewing court first noted
that a federal court lacks this authority if a provision of either the
Securities Act or Exchange Act expressly provides for a private right of
action but not for contribution."° The court reasoned that "if Congress
had intended to allow for a right of contribution under one of those
provisions Congress would have provided for one expressly. "151 The
Olympia Brewing court observed, however, that with regard to section
10(b) its analysis must be different."' The court determined that be-
cause the private right of action had been implied under section 10(b),
it would be "incongruous" for the federal courts to focus on legislative
intent in deciding the availability of contribution under that section. 153
The Olympia Brewing court reasoned that in order to determine
whether contribution under section 10(b) "should" be implied, it
would be necessary to address the policy considerations surrounding
such a right. 154 The court pointed out that earlier circuit precedent, in
Heizer, determined that contribution reinforced the deterrent policies
underlying the federal securities laws. 155 The Olympia Brewing court
called this reasoning into question, however, observing that contem-
porary analysis has suggested that a no-contribution rule in section
10(b) cases may be as great a deterrent as a rule allowing contribu-
tion.' 56 Nevertheless, the court, stating that it was bound by the prece-
dent set forth in Heizer, concluded that contribution was available
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.' 57
Significantly, in the 1989 case of King v. Gibbs, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit expressly disavowed the policy
analysis it adopted when it decided Heizer. 158 In King, the Seventh
Circuit held that indemnification was not available under Rule 10b-5. 159
Although the King court criticized its reasoning in Heizer, it did not
expressly overrule its precedent establishing an implied right to eontri-
bution.' 6°
15° Olympia Brewing, 674 F. Supp. at 615.
151 Id at 615-16.
152 1d at 616.
155 Id
154 a
155 Olympia Brewing, 674 F. Supp. at 616.
156 Id. at 616 n.20 (citing Easterbrook, Landes & Posner, Contribution Among Antitrust Defen-
dants: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 23 J.L. & ECON. 331, 349 (1980)).
157 1d at 616.
158 876 F,2d 1275, 1280 & n.8 (7th Cir. 1989).
159 Id at 1282.
100 Id. at 1280 & 11.8.
December 1993]	 IMPLYING A RIGHT OF CONTRIBUTION 	 195
The King court noted that Heizer was decided before Northwest
Airlines and Texas Industries, wherein the Supreme Court applied the
Cart test to two statutes that contained express causes of action.'" The
Seventh Circuit, in King, indicated that once a private right of action
has been implied by the courts, as in section 10(b), the courts have
broad "flexibility and discretion" in determining the available remedies
under that cause of action. 162 The court noted, however, that when a
remedy creates independent substantive rights, the same standard used
to imply any private right of action must be used to determine the
availability of that remedy.' 63 The King court determined that an im-
plied right to indemnification under Rule 10b-5 would create inde-
pendent substantive rights, because it expanded the category of possi-
ble plaintiffs and gave the court subject matter jurisdiction it would
not otherwise have. 16 ' Consequently, the King court concluded that the
Cart test should be applied in order to determine if a right of indem-
nification may be implied under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 165 After
applying this test, the King court held that indemnification was not
available.' 66
Other courts facing the issue of contribution under section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 after the decisions in Northwest Airlines and Texas
Industries and before the Supreme Court's decision in Musick have
held that an implied right to contribution was still available by main-
taining that the Supreme Court decisions in Northwest Airlines and
Texas Industries are distinguishable.' 17 This was the holding of the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio in the
1990 case of Baker v. BP America, Inc."'" The plaintiffs in Baker were
investors in a corporation that was formed to acquire a venture from
the defendant, BP America, which was divesting itself of holdings
outside the petroleum industry.' 69 The plaintiffs subsequently brought
a securities fraud claim under section 10(b) against the defendant,
claiming that the defendant had materially misrepresented the ven-
161 /d, at 1280 n.8.
162 /d. at 1279.
165 King, 876 F.2d at 1280.
164 Id.
16i See id.
166 Id. at 1280-82.
167 See, e.g., Baker v. BP America, Inc., 749 F. Supp. 840, 844 (N.D. Ohio 1990); Seiler v. E.F.
Hutton, 102 F.R.D. 880, 885-86 (D.N.J. 1984); Noonan v. Granville, 532 F. Supp. 1007, 1008
(S.D.N.Y. 1982),
168 749 F. Supp. 840, 844 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
169 /d. at 841.
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ture's potential.'" Allegedly, the principal source of the misrepresen-
tations was a BP America employee, who, like the plaintiffs, was also
an investor in the acquiring corporation."' The defendant in turn
responded with a counterclaim against the plaintiffs and a third-party
complaint against the acquiring corporation, for contribution and
indemnification.' 72
At the time Baker was decided, the question of whether contribu-
tion was available in a private cause of action brought under section
10(b) was an open one in the Sixth Circuit. 17" The Baker court refused
to accept that the Supreme Court decisions in Northwest Airlines and
Texas Industries barred recognition of a right to contribution in cases
arising under section 1 0(b)." 4 The Baker court first noted that the
Supreme Court in both decisions expressly reserved judgment on the
question of whether the reasoning adopted in those cases should be
applied to cases arising under section 1O(b) of the Exchange Act. 17"
Moreover, the court in Baker distinguished the two Supreme Court
cases as being fundamentally different from the case at hand. 17" The
Baker court reasoned that those cases dealt with statutes that expressly
created a private right of action, while at the same time omitting any
right of contribution, whereas a private right of action has itself been
judicially implied under section 10(b) . 177 Finally, the court stated that,
under the facts of this case, the defendant would not "unfairly benefit"
by seeking contribution.'" The court reasoned that the policies behind
the federal securities laws would clearly be defeated if parties could
escape liability by simply positioning themselves as plaintiffs or because
the plaintiffs failed to name all possible defendants.'"
176 Id
172 Id.
1 " Balzer, 749 F. Supp. at 842.
174 Id at 844.
175 Id, (referring to the footnotes in Texas Industries and Northwest Airlines, declining to
address correctness of reasoning used by lower courts in finding implied right of action under
§ 10(b)).
176 Id at 844. Similarly, the District Court for the Southern District of New York distinguished
Texas Industries and Northwest Airlines,  noting that the decisions expressly left open the continued
viability of an implied right of contribution under § 10(b). Noonan v. Granville, 532 F. Supp.
1007, 1008 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). Moreover, the court in Noonan noted that § 10(b) is a private cause
of action that has been judicially implied, whereas, the Supreme Court was dealing with an explicit
statutory remedy. Id.
177 Baker, 749 F. Supp. at 844.
178 Id.
179 Id
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In addition to distinguishing Northwest Airlines and Texas Indus-
tries, the Baker court relied on the same general equitable principles
and deterrence considerations that earlier courts used to imply contri-
bution under section I 0(b). 18" The court agreed with the reasoning
advanced by these earlier decisions, noting that contribution "pro-
motes a fair and equitable allocation of the plaintiffs losses among all
wrongdoers and prevents a section 10(b) defendant from risking un-
due liability resulting from arbitrary or tactical decisions by plaintiffs
regarding which parties to name as defendants to lawsuits. "18' The
court also advanced the same analogy to the express liability provisions
of the federal securities laws that was initially set forth in deHaas. 182
While the Baker court acknowledged that Congress did not recognize
a right to contribution in all of these sections, it found significant the
fact that Congress provided for contribution in the majority of sections
where it envisioned probable multiple defendants.' 83
B. The Emerging Minority Rule: Cases denying an Implied Right to
Contribution under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
Before the Supreme Court finally answered the question in Mu-
sick, there was an emerging minority rule which used the Supreme
Court decisions in Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries to deny an
implied right to contribution under section 10(b) and Rule I Ob-5.' 84
Those courts that adopted this minority position argued that the bulk
of cases finding an implied right of action were decided prior to these
Supreme Court decisions and therefore were of questionable author-
ity.'" These courts contended that the focus on congressional intent
adopted in Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries should also be ap-
180 1d. at 843.
181 See id. (citing Heiner Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 332 (7th Cir. 1979)).
183 Compare Baker, 749 F. Supp. at 842 & 11.1 with deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F.
Supp. 809, 815-16 & n.9 (D. Colo. 1968).
185 Baker, 749 F, Supp. at 842 n.l. The Baker court noted that only § 15 of the Securities Act
of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1988), and § 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78t(a) (1988) potentially impose liability on multiple defendants without providing for contri-
bution. Id.
I" See Baker 749 F. Stipp. at 843 (recognizing "emerging minority rule" but finding its
reasoning unpersuasive). While the only court of appeals to adopt the minority rule has been
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, a number of lower courts have also
held that there is no right of contribution under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. See, e.g., Chutich v.
Touche Ross & Co,, 960 E2d 721, 723, 724 (8th Cir. 1992); Robin v. Doctors Officenters Corp.,
730 F Supp. 122, 125 (N.D. 1989); In re Professional Fin. Management, 683 F. Supp. 1283,
1286 (D. Minn. 1988).
185 See Chutich, 960 F.2d at 722; In re Professional Fin. Management, 683 F. Supp. at 1286-87.
198	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 35:175
plied to determine whether the federal courts have the power to create
a right of contribution under the federal securities laws, where such a
right is not provided for expressly.'" These courts concluded that
applying such an analysis, rather than the prior policy approach
adopted by other courts, indicates that the federal courts lack the
power to imply a right of contribution under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5.' 87
In determining that the Supreme Court's analysis in Northwest
Airlines and Texas Industries should be applied in the section 10(b)
context, these courts reasoned that although the courts have implied
a private right of action under section 10(b), whether an implied right
of contribution exists is a separate inquiry.'" A right of contribution,
these courts noted, is a separate remedy that creates independent
substantive rights.'" These courts determined that before implying a
right to contribution under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, a court must
apply the same analysis used to imply any other private right of ac-
tion.'"
Only one circuit court had expressly denied the availability of
contribution under section 10(b) and Rule 1013-5. 191 Applying the
analysis set forth in Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in the March 1992 case
of Chutich v. Touche Ross & Co., held that there was no right of
contribution under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.' 92 The Chutich court
recognized the great weight of authority implying a right of contribu-
tion, but reasoned that this authority had developed without the courts
addressing the threshold question of whether federal courts have the
power to create a right of contribution under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5.'" The Eighth Circuit noted that Northwest Airlines and Texas
Industries "restrict the implication of contribution rights under the
196 See Chutich, 960 F.2d at 722-23; In re Professional Fin. Management, 683 F. Supp. at 1285.
187 See Chutich, 960 F.2d at 723-24; Robin, 730 F, Supp. at 125.
1e41 See, e.g., Robin, 730 F. Supp. at 123-24.
189 See, e.g., id. But cl Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 333 n.6 (7th Cir. 1979) (noting it
is unnecessary to determine if contribution is implicit under § 10(b) because civil remedy has
already been implied under section and contribution is ancillary to that remedy).
1811 See, e.g., Robin, 730 F. Supp. at 123.
191 See Chutich, 960 F.2d at 723-24 (federal courts powerless to create right of action for
contribution under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without statutory or federal common law basis and
no such basis exists). It is significant that in 1989, in King v. Gibbs, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disavowed its earlier policy approach in Heizer, when it held that
indemnification was not available under Rule 10b-5, after applying the Northwest Airlines and
Texas Industries analysis. King, 876 F.2d at 1280 & n.8. Although the Seventh Circuit in King
criticized its Heizer decision, it did not expressly overrule it. Id.
192 See Chutich, 960 F.2d at 723-24 (8th Cir. 1992).
193 M. at 722.
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securities laws" and require a different analysis than that taken by
earlier courts in determining the existence of such rights.'" The Chu-
tich court concluded that the same analysis that the Supreme Court
used in Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries, which involved statutes
with express private rights of action, should also be applied when the
underlying liability is based on an implied right of action as in section
10(b) . 195
In determining that the Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries
analysis should apply to a claim for contribution under section 10(b),
the Chutich court noted that the Supreme Court has consistently at-
tempted to follow congressional intent when defining the contours of
that section. 196
 Moreover, the court observed that a double standard
for implying rights of contribution would result if this analysis were
only applied in cases in which the underlying private right of action
was express rather than implied."' Thus, as a matter of judicial re-
straint, the Chutich court concluded that the analysis in Northwest
Airlines and Texas Industries should also be applied in cases involving
implied private rights of action. 198
 Otherwise, courts would be free to
create new rights of action, such as contribution, when there is an
implied private right of action, but restricted to congressional intent
or federal common law when there was an express private right of
action,"°
In applying the two-part analysis in Northwest Airlines and Texas
Industries, the Eighth Circuit accepted the determination that there
was no basis for implying a right of contribution under section 10(b)
or Rule 10b-5,20° In reaching this conclusion, the court deferred to the
careful analysis by the district court. 201 The Chutich court noted that
the district court found that the legislative history, statutory scheme
and other Cart factors indicated a lack of congressional intent that
would allow a court to imply a right of contribution. 202
194 See
195 1d. at 722-23.
196 /d. at 723 (citing Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v, Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479-80 (1977) (examining
statutory language and purpose behind 1934 Act to determine whether § 10(b) covers corporate
mismanagement); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197-211 (1976) (examining statu-
tory language and legislative history to determine whether § 10(b) requires scienter)).





202 See Chutich, 960 F.2d at 723 (citing Chutich v. Touche Ross & Co., 759 F. Supp. 1403, 1407
(D. Minn, 1991)).
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The Chutich court next addressed whether a right of action for
contribution could be created through federal common law. 200 The
party seeking contribution in Chutich asserted that the courts have the
power to fashion federal common law in the area of securities fraud,
because the private right of action for violations of section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 were judicially created."' The Chutich court rejected this
assertion.205 The court reasoned that contribution among securities
laws violators did not fall within any of the narrowly drawn categories
recognized by the Supreme Court as areas in which the federal courts
have the power to fashion federal common law. 206
In addition, the Chutich court determined that there was no con-
gressional authorization for the federal courts to formulate common
law in this area, noting that there is no provision in the Exchange Act
that confers upon the federal courts a broad power to develop a federal
common law of securities regulation. 207 Although federal courts have
broad discretion in determining appropriate remedies once a right of
action has been implied, the Chutich court determined that such dis-
cretion does not provide the courts with the power to create a "new"
right of action. 208 The court reasoned that, unlike the discretion to
allow appropriate relief, the power to create a new cause of action for
contribution broadens federal judicial power into an area that has
been properly reserved for the executive and legislative branches of
government.'" The court concluded that absent congressional authori-
zation to formulate federal common law for securities regulation, the
federal courts have no common law power to create a right of action
for contribution under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 21 °
In an earlier decision in 1989, the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois, in Robin v. Doctors Officenters Corp.,
also held that a private cause of action for contribution could not be




207 Chutich, 960 F.2d at 724. Indeed, the Court in Texas Industries noted that:
absent some congressional authorization to formulate substantive rules of decision,
federal common law exists only in such narrow areas as those concerned with the
rights and obligations of the United States, interstate and international disputes
implicating the conflicting rights of States or our relations with foreign nations, and
admiralty cases.
Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) (emphasis added).
208 Chutich, 960 F.2d at 724.
209 Id, (quoting Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1037 (1992)).
210 m
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implied under section 10(b) and Rule 1013-5. 211 The plaintiffs in Robin
were investors in a public offering of stock of Doctors Officenters
Corporationf'' These investors brought an action asserting claims of
common law fraud and violations of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 215
Subsequently, the defendants in the action filed a third-party complaint
seeking contribution under both claims.'"
In attempting to discern whether contribution was available to
these defendants, the Robin court first addressed the fundamental
question of whether the implied right of action under Rule 10b-5
"includes" contribution, or whether "a separate right of contribution
had to be implied."215
 Adopting the reasoning that the Seventh Circuit
used in King v. Gibbs, the Robin court noted that in order to imply a
remedy that creates independent substantive rights, a court must apply
the same analysis as it does to imply any other private right of action. 2 i 6
Thus, just as the Seventh Circuit in King determined that a right to
indemnification under Rule 10b-5 was a substantive right, the Robin
court determined that a right of contribution was also substantive. 217
The Robin court observed that contribution, like indemnification,
would create both a new class of plaintiffs under Rule 10b-5 and confer
subject matter jurisdiction on the federal courts over a new class of
cases. 218 The Robin court concluded that in order to imply a right of
contribution under Rule 10b-5, a court must first apply the tort test as
it was applied in King.m
211 730 F. Supp. 122, 125 (N.D. III, 1989).
2111
 hi at 122.
113 M.
214 Id.
21G Id. at 123.
2111 Robin, 730 F. Supp. at 123. The Seventh Circuit in King noted that once courts have
recognized an implied right of action, as in § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, then the courts normally
would have "broad flexibility and discretion" in determining the available remedies under that
section. King v. Gibbs, 876 F.2d 1275, 1279 (7th Cir. 1989). This broad discretion, however, is only
available when the remedy is ancillary to the cause of action that has already been implied and
does not create independent substantive rights. Id. at 1280. The court determined, therefore,
that because a right to indenmitication creates additional substantive rights for plaintiffs, it is not
simply an "adjunct to the § 10(b) and Rule I0b-5 cause of action." Id. Thus, the King court
concluded that the standard for creating a right of contribution must be the same standard that
is used to imply any other private right of action. Id.
2/ 7 See Robin, 730 F. Supp. at 123-24. The Ninth Circuit, in Employers Insurance of Wausau v.
Musick, Peeler Ca' Garrett, also determined that the right of contribution was substantive in nature.
954 F.2c1575, 577 (9th Cir. 1992). The Ninth Circuit, however, did not apply the Cort/Kirtganalysis
to imply a private right of action. See id. Rather, the court simply followed circuit precedent. that
had recognized that § 10(b) and Rule 10b.5 imply a right of contribution. Id.
21K Robin, 730 F. Supp. at 124.
219 id.
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The Robin court went on to apply the Cort test, recognizing that
the Supreme Court in a number of recent decisions, including North-
west Airlines and Texas Industries, had made it clear that the primary
focus of the four-part test is on the second factor—whether Congress
intended to create a private cause of action under the statute. 22° Ad-
dressing the first factor of the Cort test, the Robin court looked to
whether the defendants seeking contribution were "of the class for
whose especial benefit the statute was enacted. "221 The court deter-
mined that, like the parties seeking indemnification in King, those
seeking contribution in this case would be of the same class, namely,
those accused of violating the securities laws, and that there was no
indication that Congress was concerned with the protection of such
parties and, thus, certainly did not enact section 10(b) for their "espe-
cial benefit. "222
Next, the Robin court turned to the second factor of the Cart test,
whether there was any indication of legislative intent that would allow
implying a right of contribution. 223 The court noted that the legislative
history was not helpful in discerning congressional intent because the
private right of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 has itself
been implied. 224 Moreover, the Robin court rejected the defendants'
argument that contribution should be implied because other provi-
sions of the securities laws expressly permit i t.. 225 The court reasoned
that because Congress only provided for contribution in three of the
seven express civil liability provisions, the defendants' argument is
"neutral" as to whether Congress would have provided for contribution
under section 10(b), had it expressly provided for a cause of action
220 Id at 124-25. In making its assessment that the Cart test has been modified to focus on
legislative intent, the Robin court referred to a statement in the Kingdecision wherein the Seventh
Circuit cited to a number of recent Supreme Court decisions applying the Cart test. Id. (citing
King, 876 F.2d at 1280-81). Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that the first and third factors
of the Curt test act as aids in determining congressional intent_ See Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 560,575-76 (1979). Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit in King noted that it
is "unclear" whether the fourth factor, which looks at whether the cause of action is a matter of
state concern, has any continuing significance. King, 876 F.2d at 1280. Moreover, the Supreme
Court in Northwest Airlines indicated that the Carl test should focus on congressional intent when
it stated that unless such intent "can be inferred from the legislative language of the statute, the
statutory structure, or some other source, the essential predicate for implication of a remedy
simply does not exist." Northwest Airlines, inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO,
451 U.S. 77,94 (1981).
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under that section.22(' Thus, finding that a party seeking contribution
is not a member of the protected class and that there is an absence of
legislative intent favoring contribution, the Robin court concluded that
no further analysis under Con was required, and that a right of contri-
bution could not be implied under section 10(b) and Rule 1013-5, 227
In addition, the court in Robin addressed the policy considerations
for implying a right of contribution. 228
 The court acknowledged that
there was ample authority suggesting that contribution would further
the deterrent objectives of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.22° The court
noted, however, that while these policy considerations may favor con-
tribution, "policy analysis has no role in the implication of a right to
con tribution." 2'"
Similarly, in 1988, in In re Professional Financial Management, the
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, using the
analysis adopted in Northwest Airlines and 'Texas Industries, held that no
implied right to contribution exists under section 10(b) and Rule
1010-5. 231
 Although the Supreme Court in those decisions expressly
declined to issue a ruling with respect to contribution under the
securities laws, the Professional Financial Management court explained
that nowhere did the Supreme Court suggest that its analysis was
inapplicable to such a claim under those laws."2
 Applying this analysis,
the court found that it is very unlikely that section 10(b) was enacted
to benefit parties that have allegedly engaged in securities fraud, 2" In
fact, the Professional Financial Management court reasoned that parties
seeking contribution were actually members of the class that Congress
intended to regulate in order to benefit "an entirely different class." 2"
Moreover, the court observed that when Congress desires to provide
for contribution it knows how to, because it has expressly provided for
such a right in other sections of the federal securities laws. 235
 The





231 683 F. Supp. 12133, 1286 (1). Minn.. 1988).




 M.; see also Texas Indus., Inc, v, Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 n.lI (1981)
(express provisions in certain sections of securities acts indicate Congress knows how to define
right to contribution); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, AFL-C10,
451 U.S. 77, 91 n.24 (1981) (limited number of provisions for contribution under federal
securities laws demonstrates when Congress intended to allow for contribution it did so expressly).
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Professional Financial Management court reasoned that Congress's fail-
ure to provide for a right of contribution under section 10(b) suggests
that it did not intend that one be created by the courts. 236 The court
also questioned whether as a policy matter contribution furthers the
deterrence purposes of the federal securities laws.237 Finally, with re-
spect to the idea of fairness, the Professional Financial Management
court reasoned that because scienter is necessary to establish liability
under Rule 10b-5, it would not be unfair to deny contribution in such
actions."8
Another lower court, following the analysis in Northwest Airlines
and Texas Industries to determine whether there is an implied right of
action for contribution, was the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of North Carolina in the 1989 case of First Financial
Savings Bank v. American Bankers Insurance Co. 239 The First Financial
court held that there is no implied right of contribution under section
10(b) of the Exchange Act."' The First Financial court relied on the
Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Baker, Watts & Company v. Miles &
Stockbridge, wherein that court held that there was no right of action
for contribution or indemnity among violators of section 12(2) of the
Securities Act."' Thus, focusing on whether Congress intended a right
of action for contribution to exist under section 10(b), the court in
First Financial determined that because the history and purpose of the
federal securities laws, as well as their plain language and structure, do
not suggest that implied rights of contribution be recognized generally,
then it would be unlikely that an implied right of contribution was
meant to be recognized under § 10(b) . 242 In support of its holding, the
court in First Financial noted that there have been many recent Su-
preme Court decisions indicating a reluctance on the part of that
Court to recognize private rights of action in the absence of express
statutory direction. 243
 The First Financial court found that these Su-
preme Court decisions constituted a "clear and pervasive trend" that
supported a denial of an implied right of contribution under section
10(b).244
236 Professional Fin. Management, 683 F. Supp. at 1286.
297
	 at 1287 (citing Loewenstein, supra note 7, at 573).
238 Id.; see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochlelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (scienter required under
Rule 10b-5).
238 [1989-90 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,824 at 94,444.
24° Id. at 94,447.
241 Id. See Baker, Watts & Co. v. Miles & Stockbridge, 876 F.2d 1101, 1106 (4th Cir. 1989).
242 First Financial, [1989-90 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 94,447.
243 Id at 94,446.
244 Id at 94,447.
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V. THE SUPREME COURT ANSWERS THE QUESTION: MUS ICK, PEELER
& GARRETT V. EMPLOYERS INSURANCE OF WA USA U
The uncertainty created by the decisions in Northwest Airlines and
Texas Industries and the emerging minority rule denying an implied
right to contribution under section 10(b) and Rule 1013.5 was finally
addressed by the United States Supreme Court when it decided Musick,
Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Insurance of Wausau. 245 In Musick, the
Supreme Court held that defendants in an action under section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 have a private right of action for contribution against
others who arc jointly responsible for violating those provisions 246 In
reaching its decision in Musick, the Supreme Court declined to address
the merits of the actual contribution claim in the case; however, for
purposes of this Note a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's opinion is
appropriate before the Supreme Court's decision is analyzed.247
In January 1992, in Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Musick, Peeler
& Garrett, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that the provisions of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 imply a right
of contribution, and that a settlement agreement cannot be relied
upon to bar subsequent actions for contribution by settling parties
against parties not involved in the original suit. 2" In Musick, Cousins
Home Furnishing, Inc. made a public offering of its stock. 249 Share-
holders who purchased shares in the offering subsequently filed a class
action against Cousins, its holding company, certain of its officers and
directors, and its underwriters:25° The complaint alleged certain viola-
tions of the federal securities laws, including section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5. 25 ' The complaint, however, did not name the attorneys and
accountants who were involved in the offering. 252
The defendants eventually settled the class action by agreeing to
pay the plaintiff shareholders $13.5 million, and this settlement was
245 Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 113 S. Ct. 2085 (1993).
246 Id. at 2092.
247 Id. at 2086. In order to resolve the conflict among the Circuits which was created by the
Eighth Circuit's decision in Chutich v. Touche Ross & Company, the Supreme Court granted
Musick, Peeler & Garrett's petition for a writ of certiorari on the sole question of "IwThether
federal courts may imply a private right to contribution in Section 10(h) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities & Exchange Conunission." Id. at 2087.
248 Employees ins, of Wausau v. Musick, Peeler & Garrett, 954 F.2d 575, 577, 579 (9th Cir.
1992).
245 1d. at 576.
250 Id.
251 Id, at 577.
252 Id. at 576.
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approved by the district court after a "good faith" hearing to determine
the defendants' fair share of damages. 2" Employers Insurance of Wau-
sau ("Wausau") and Federal Insurance Co. ("Federal"), the insurers of
the settling defendants, paid their appropriate percentages of the
settlement amount. 254 After settling, Wausau and Federal commenced
an action seeking contribution against the attorneys and accountants
involved in the public offering.255 The district court dismissed the
action, holding that the settling defendants had paid no more than
their "fair share" of the total liability and therefore Wausau and Federal
were not entitled to contribution under the federal securities laws. 2"
The Ninth Circuit. reversed, however, holding that Wausau and Federal
had stated a valid claim for contribution under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5.2"7
In reaching its decision the Ninth Circuit noted that, although the
right of contribution is not expressly provided for in section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, circuit precedent had recognized that these provisions
imply such a right.'" The Ninth Circuit went on to note that a right of
contribution is substantive in nature, and that such a claim may be
brought in a separate suit against parties not involved in the original
suit. 2 ° Furthermore, while observing that an action for contribution is
only available when a party has paid more than its fair share of com-
mon liability, the Ninth Circuit noted that the meaning of the term
"fair share" depends upon the context in which it is used. 26" The court
reasoned, therefore, that although the defendants may have paid their
fair share of damages "relative to the other defendants involved in the
litigation," a claim for contribution depends on whether an individual
tortfeasor has paid his or her fair share relative to all possible joint
tortfeasors, including those not parties to the original suit.2"' Thus, the
court held that the settlement agreement cannot be relied upon to
deny actions for contribution by defendants who have settled against
other possible joint tortfeasors who were not a party to the original
suit. 262
253 Musick, 954 F.2d at 576-77.
21 Id. at 577.
255 Id. at 576.
256 Id. at 577.
257 See id. at 577.
255 See Musick, 954 F.2d at 577 (citing Franklin v. Kaypro Corp., 884 F.2d 1222,1226 (9th Cir.
1989); Smith v. Mulvaney, 827 F.2d 558,561 (9th Cir. 1987)).
255 Id at 577.
265 Id. at 578. •
2111 See id. at 578-79.
2"2 Id. at. 579.
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The Ninth Circuit further concluded that policy considerations
also favored allowing contribution.'" The court noted that contribu-
tion against nonparties assures that all culpable parties will be pun-
ished, and furthers the deterrent objectives of the federal securities
laws by not allowing an entire category of joint tortfeasors to escape
liability.264 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit observed that contribution
against nonparties promotes fairness by limiting liability to a joint
tortfeasor's relative culpability.'" The court also pointed out that allow-
ing contribution would encourage settlement because named defen-
dants are more likely to settle when they know they will not be prohib-
ited from seeking subsequent claims of contribution against other joint
tortfeasors.256 Although the Ninth Circuit recognized that contribution
claims require additional litigation, the court reasoned that Congress
has deemed such litigation costs acceptable in the context of securities
law because it has expressly provided for contribution under other
sections of the federal securities laws. 267 Moreover, the court pointed
out that its holding would not create an "endless stream of contribu-
tion claims" because such claims only arise when a party has paid more
than its share of the common liability and once this share is paid, a
party becomes immune from any subsequent contribution claims.'"
Following the Ninth Circuit's decision in Musick, the United States
Supreme Court, in October 1992, granted Musick, Peeler & Garrett's
petition for certiorari."" The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of
the Ninth Circuit that defendants have a right to contribution under
section 10(b) and Rule 101b-5 and that federal courts have the power
to imply such a right. 27° In his majority opinion, Justice Kennedy, joined
by Justices Rehnquist, White, Stevens, Scalia and Souter, first distin-
guished the precedents set forth in Northwest Airlines and Texas Indus-
tries and determined it was "futile" to look for congressional intent to
allow a right to contribution where the underlying private cause of
action under section 10(b) and Rule 1013-5 is itself created by judicial
implication.27 ' Rather, the Court in Musick determined that a right of
contribution is within the contours of the implied private cause of
263 Musick, 954 F.2d at 579-80.
264 Id. at 579.
211 Id.
266 Id. at 580.
267 Id.
268 Musick 954 F.2d at 580,
269 113 S. Ct. 54 (1992), granting cert. in 954 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1992).
279 See Musick 113 S. CL. at 2092.
271 See id. at 2087-88.
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action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and that the federal courts
have the power to shape the contours of that action. 272 Thus, by relying
on two analogous provisions under the Exchange Act that provide for
an express right to contribution, the Court in Musick inferred that the
1934 Congress in enacting section 10(b) would have provided for a
right of contribution among joint tortfeasors if it had considered the
issue.273
In finding an implied right to contribution under section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5, the Court in Musick first distinguished its decisions in
Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries.274 The Court noted that unlike
the express private causes of action under the statutes in those cases,
the private cause of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is itself
implied. 278 Accordingly, the Court determined that the inquiries into
congressional intent that were applied in Northwest Airlines and Texas
Industries are "not helpful" in the context of an action under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5:276 The Court noted that where the private cause
of action has itself been created by implication, it would be "futile" to
ask whether the 1934 Congress intended to allow a right to contribu-
tion for that action. 277
After rejecting the congressional intent analysis adopted in North-
west Airlines and Texas Industries, the Court in Musick determined that
it has the power to shape the contours of the section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 private right of action as a matter of federal common law. 278
Although it acknowledges that a right to contribution is a separate,
independent cause of action, the Court determined that an action for
contribution under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is inextricably bound
to the private cause of action under those provisions:279 According to
the Court, a violation of the federal securities laws gives rise to the
private cause of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and the
question of contribution is merely ancillary to that action because it
only involves how damages are to be shared among those joint tortfea-
272 /d. at 2089.
273 la at 2089-91.
274 Id at 2087.
275 Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2087-88.
276 1d. at 2088. The Court noted that "[t]he private right of action under Rule lob-5 was
implied by the judiciary on the theory courts should recognize private remedies to supplement
federal statutory duties, not on the theory Congress had given an unequivocal direction to the
courts to do so." Id. (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730, 737
(1975)).
277 M
278 Id. at 2088-89.
279 Id. at 2088,
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sors that are already subject to liability."" Because the underlying liabil-
ity in an action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 has itself been
implied, the Court noted that it would be unfair to those defendants
against whom damages are assessed if the federal courts lacked the
authority to allocate those damages under the theory that Congress
did not address the issue."'
In discerning whether Congress intended the federal courts to
shape the contours of the implied right of action under section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5, the Court in Musick relied on two congressional
statutes. 282
 The first statute was the Insider Trading and Securities
Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, wherein Congress expressly provided
that nothing contained in that Act "shall be construed to limit or
condition . . . the availability of any cause of action implied from a
provision of this chapter."285
 The second statute that the Court relied
on was Congress's adoption of section 27A of the Exchange Act which
limited the retroactive application of the Supreme Court's decision in
Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilberison, 284 relating to the
appropriate statute of limitations to be applied in a Rule 101)-5 ac-
6011. 2" The Musick Court inferred from these statutes "an acknow-
ledgment of the 10b-5 action without any further legislative intent to
define it. . That task, it would appear, Congress has left to us." 2"
Having determined that the federal courts have the power to
shape the contours of the private right of action under section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5, the Musick Court next addressed whether the right to
contribution is within the contours of that action.287 The Court first
refused to address the various policy arguments concerning whether a
rule of contribution or no contribution is more efficient or more
equitable.2" Instead, the Musick Court attempted to infer how the 1934
Congress would have addressed the issue had the private cause of
28° Musick, 113 S. CL at 2088.
281 Id.
282
 Id. at 2089.
282 See id. See also Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Entbrcement Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-704,102 Stat. 4680 (codified at 15 U.S.G. 78t-1 (1988)).
284 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991).
285 See Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2089.
288 Id. at 2089.
287 /d. at 2089-92.
288 Id. at 2089. The Musick Court noted that just as it had declined to rule on the policy
considerations regarding a right to contribution in Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries, it
would also decline to do so with respect to a right to contribution under 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
Id.
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action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 been included as an express
provision in the Exchange Act. 289
In inferring what the 1934 Congress would have done, the Court
took into account the portions of the Exchange Act most analogous to
the implied cause of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, to
ensure that the rules established to govern that action are "symmetrical
and consistent with the overall structure of the Act."29° Thus, the
Musick Court found congressional approval of a right to contribution
from the express liability provisions contained in sections 9 and 18 of
the Exchange Act. 291 The Court noted that these sections are analogous
to section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in that they target the same type of
conduct and have the same purpose of deterring fraudulent and ma-
nipulative practices. 292 Moreover, the Court pointed out that of the
eight express liability provisions contained in the Securities Act and
the Exchange Act, sections 9 and 18 impose liability upon defendants
that are the most similarly situated to those defendants in an action
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in determining whether they
should be entitled to contribution.298 Thus, because sections 9 and 18
both confer an express right to contribution, the Musick Court deter-
mined that consistency within the federal securities laws requires that
a similar right of contribution be adopted in actions under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 294
Finally, the Court in Musick acknowledged that its conclusion that
an implied right to contribution exists under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 is consistent with the rule adopted by the majority of federal
courts that had previously considered the issue. 295 Thus, the Court
noted that over the twenty-five years that a right to contribution was
first implied by the court in deHaas, neither the SEC nor the federal
courts have suggested that such a right detracts from the implied
289 Id. at 2089-91.
290 Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2090.
291 Id at 2090-91.
292 /d at 2090.
298 Id The Court pointed out that like the implied cause of action under § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5, the express causes of action under §§ 9 and 18 of the Exchange Act: (1) impose direct,
rather than derivative, liability on defendants; (2) require a showing that the defendants acted
with scienter; and (3) impose liability on multiple defendants acting in concert_ Id. at 2090-91.
But see Baker v. BP America, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 840, 842 & n.1 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (noting § 15 of
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1988), and § 20(a) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1988) potentially impose liability on multiple defendants without providing
for express right of contribution).
294 Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2091.
295 Id
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private cause of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 or that such
a right interferes with the purposes underlying the federal securities
laws. 296
The dissent in Musick was written by Justice Thomas, who was
joined by Justices Blackmun and O'Connor. 207 Justice Thomas dis-
agreed with the majority's assumption that a right to contribution is
merely ancillary to the implied private cause of action under section
10 (b) and Rule 10b-5. 222 Rather, Justice Thomas noted that contribu-
tion, unlike a statute of limitations or a defense to liability, is a separate
cause of action distinct from the implied private cause of action. 299
Justice Thomas pointed out that a right to contribution is not a ques-
tion of shaping the contours of the implied private cause of action
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, but is a question of whether a
defendant in such an action "enjoys a distinct right to recover from a
joint tortfeasor."""
According to Justice Thomas, the proper analysis for determining
whether an implied right to contribution exists under section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 is that set out in Northwest Airlines and Texas Indus-
tries."' In applying this analytical framework, Justice Thomas con-
cluded that there is no right to contribution under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5. 302 He first noted that the federal courts lack the power to
fashion a federal common law right to contribution." 3 In addition, by
focusing on the language of the statute and congressional intent,
Justice Thomas determined that Congress neither expressly nor by
clear implication intended a right of contribution under section 10(b)
and Rule 1011-5. 304
Finally, Justice Thomas pointed out that without addressing the
threshold question of whether the federal courts have the power to
create a right of contribution absent congressional intent to do so, the
Court joins the debate over the advantages and disadvantages of allow-
ing a right to contribution."' He indicated that it is irrelevant whether
the answer to this threshold question is "most unfair" to litigants in an
290 Id.
297 See id. at 2092 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
298 /d. at 2093 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
299 Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2093 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
3°°/d. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
" I See id. at 2094 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See supra notes 84-122 and accompanying text.
902
 See Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2094-95 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
"3 Id. at 2094 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
3°4 See ed. at 2094-95 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
3°3 See id. at 2095-95 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 306 Thus, according to Jus-
tice Thomas, the courts "should not treat legislative and administrative
silence as a tacit license to accomplish what Congress and the SEC are
unable or unwilling to do," and although section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
do not afford a right to contribution, Congress remains free to create
one. 30'7
VI. Do THE FEDERAL COURTS HAVE THE POWER TO IMPLY A PRIVATE
RIGHT OF ACTION FOR CONTRIBUTION UNDER SECTION 10(b)
AND RULE 1013-5?
Until the Supreme Court's decision in Musick, whether a right of
contribution existed under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 was a question that the lower federal courts
had been facing for the past twenty-five years."8 If in drafting section
10(b), Congress had expressly provided or prohibited a private right
of action for contribution, then the issue would have been settled and
the uncertainty that existed prior to Musick with respect to such a right
would never have surfaced. Congress, however, did not do so, and the
question of whether contribution is available to defendants in cases
arising under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 was left to the federal
courts. Although the Supreme Court in Musick finally answered this
question in the affirmative, the analysis the Court used in implying a
right to contribution under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is question-
able.
In analyzing whether contribution properly exists under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, it is necessary to address the fundamental
threshold issue of whether the federal courts have the power to create
such a right.'" Prior to Musick, the great weight of federal authority
that had recognized an implied right of contribution overlooked this
threshold issue and was based mainly on policy considerations."'° The
Supreme Court has since restricted the implication of such a right by
adopting an analytical framework that focuses on congressional intent
and federal common law.'" Although rejected by the Supreme Court
306 See id at 2096 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
"7 Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2096 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
" In 1968, the United States District Court for the District of Colorado was the first court
to directly address the issue of the availability of contribution under § 10(b) and Rule 106-5. See
deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809 (D. Colo. 1968); In re Olympia Brewing Co.
Sec. Litig., 674 F. Supp. 597, 614 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (noting deHaas was first case to address issue).
309 See Chutich v. Touche Ross & Co., 960 F.2d 721, 722 (8th Cir. 1992).
310 IcL
sn See id. See also Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 646-47 (1981)
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in Musick, the proper analysis for determining whether contribution
can be judicially created under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 appears
to be the analytical framework that was adopted in Northwest Airlines,
Inc. v. Transport Workers Union and Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff
Materials, lnc. 312
 In both of these decisions, the Court applied the Curt
test that is used to determine whether a private right of action can be
implied under a federal statute.'"
Some courts have pointed out that the application of the Cort test
is unnecessary when it comes to implying a right of contribution under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 3" For instance, in Heizer, the Seventh
Circuit reasoned that the test had been successfully applied in implying
the private cause of action under section 10(b) and that a right of
contribution should simply follow because it is only ancillary to the
existing cause of action under section 10(b). 315 The rationale is that
once a court has implied a private right of action, it has broad discre-
tion to determine the remedies and parameters under that cause of
action.'" 6 This is the same approach that the Supreme Court took when
it decided Musick, where it determined that a right to contribution is
ancillary to the implied cause of action under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 because it involves the question of how damages are to be shared
among those already subject to liability under those provisions.'"
The reasoning in Musick and Heizer appears to be unsound be-
cause it fails to recognize that a right to contribution is substantive in
nature and requires a wholly separate cause of action."s As noted in
Robin, a right to contribution creates independent substantive rights
because it creates a new class of plaintiffs and would confer subject
matter jurisdiction to the federal courts over a new class of cases. 3 ' 9
Thus, in order to imply an independent substantive right such as
contribution, the Cort test should be applied as it is to any other
(regardless of merits of conflicting policy arguments, federal court may not have authority to
create contribution absent congressional intent or without federal common law basis); Northwest
Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, AFL-C10, 451 U.S. 77, 98 tt.41 (1981)
(despite assumption that policies favor contribution, court lacks power to create such right absent
legislative intent or without federal common law basis).
312 See 451 U.S. 77, 90-91 (1981); 451 U.S. 630, 638 (1981).
313 See Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 639; Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 91.
514 See, e.g., Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 333 ti.6 (7th Cir. 1979).
315 Id. It is significant to note that the Seventh Circuit, while not expressly overruling Heixer,
has subsequently disavowed the analysis it used there. See King v. Gibbs, 876 F.2d 1275, 1280 &
n.8 (7th Cir. 1989).
3111 See, e.g., Robin v. Doctors Officenters Corp., 730 F. Supp. 122, 123 (N.D. III. 1989).
9t7 See Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2088.
318 See id. at 2093 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
919 Robin, 730 F, Supp. at 124.
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putative private right of action."° In applying the Cart test for deter-
mining contribution under the federal securities laws, as it was applied
in Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries, a court addresses the thresh-
old issue of whether it has the power to create such a right.
Other courts, including the Supreme Court in Musick, confront-
ing the analysis that the Supreme Court adopted in Northwest Airlines
and Texas Industries have found the cases distinguishable and have
refused to apply the analysis to determine if a right to contribution is
properly created by the courts."' These courts reason that the Supreme
Court decisions involved statutes with express private rights of action
and no express right of contribution, whereas the private right of
action in section 10(b) has been judicially implied. 322 This rationale is
faulty for two reasons. First, as noted above, contribution is a substan-
tive right and the power of the courts to create such a right relies on
the analysis in Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries. Secondly, refus-
ing to apply this analysis in cases in which the underlying private action
is implied would create a double standard for implying rights of con-
tribution. 323 Courts would be free to create new rights of action when
there is an implied private right of action, but these courts would be
restricted in creating such rights by the analysis in Northwest Airlines
and Texas Industries, when the case involves an express private right of
actio n."4
Although the Supreme Court in Musick declined to do so, when
the two-part analysis in Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries is applied
to the availability of contribution under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
it is apparent that the federal courts lack the power to create such a
right. 325 First, by focusing on legislative intent, it is apparent that Con-
gress did not create a right of action by implication. 326 There is no
indication that parties seeking contribution are members of the class
whom Congress intended to protect when it enacted section 1 0 (b). In
fact, such parties are defendants in section 10(b) actions and constitute
32° See id at 123-24.
321 See, e.g., Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2087-88; Baker v. BP America, Inc., 749 F. Supp. 840, 844
(N.D. Ohio 1990).
322 See, e.g., Musick, 113 S. Ct at 2087-88; Baker, 749 F. Supp. at 844.
323 See Chutich v. Touche Ross & Co., 960 F.2d 721, 723 (8th Cir. 1992).
. 324 See id
323 See id. at 723-24 (applying analysis in Texas Industries and Northwest Airlines indicates
there is no statutory or federal common law basis for creating implied right of contribution under
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
326 See, e.g., Chutich, 960 F.2d at 723, an Chutich v. Green Tree Acceptance, Inc., 759 F.
Supp. 1403 (D. Minn. 1991); Robin v. Doctors Officenters Corp., 730 F. Supp. 122, 125 (N.D. III.
1989).
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the members of the class that Congress intended to regulate for the
benefit of an entirely distinct class." 7
Furthermore, the legislative history and statutory scheme of the
federal securities laws do not provide a basis on which to imply an
intent to create contribution rights. The legislative history is not help-
ful in finding congressional intent to make contribution available to
section 10(b) defendants because the private right of action under that
section has been judicially implied."" Moreover, the fact that Congress
provided express rights to contribution in three of the seven express
liability provisions under the federal securities laws is not persuasive of
Congress's intent with respect to section 10(b). 32" This fact, as one
court has noted, is neutral at best."" The fact that Congress has pro-
vided a right to contribution in some sections of the securities acts and
not others indicates that Congress knows how to provide for such a
right when it desires to do so. Furthermore, Congress may have in-
tended to limit contribution rights only to those sections where it
expressly provided for such rights. Thus, because those seeking contri-
bution are not in the class protected by the securities laws and there
is no congressional intent favoring contribution, the federal courts lack
the power to create such a right by implication.
This reasoning is also true with respect to the Musick Court's
reliance on sections 9 and 18 of the Exchange Act when it attempts to
infer what the 1934 Congress would have done had it addressed the
issue of contribution under section 10(b). As sections 9 and 18 dem-
onstrate, when Congress wished to provide for a right of contribution
it had no trouble doing so expressly. Furthermore, the absence of a
right to contribution in certain express liability provisions of the fed-
eral securities laws, in light of the fact that other express liability
provisions provide for such a right, does not support an inference that
the 1934 Congress would have wanted a right of contribution under
section 10(b).
Application of the second part of the analysis in Northwest Airlines
and Texas Industries indicates that the federal courts also lack a federal
common law basis for creating a right of contribution under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Although the federal courts, unlike state courts,
do not generally have lawmaking powers, the Supreme Court has
527 See, e.g., Robin, 730 F. Supp. at 125; In re Professional Fin. Management, 683 F. Supp. 1283,
1286 (1). Minn. 1988).
528 See Robin, 730 F. Supp, at 125.
529
 See id.; Chudch v. Green Tree Acceptance, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 1403, 1407 (D. Minn. 1991),
alp sub nom Clititich v. Touche Ross & Co., 960 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1992).
540 See Robin, 730 F. Supp. at 125.
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recognized the need to allow the creation of federal common law in a
few limited areas."' Like the claims in Northwest Airlines and Texas
Industries, however, a claim for contribution under section 10(b) does
not come within any of those narrowly drawn categories that the
Supreme Court has recognized as areas where the federal courts have
the power to establish federal common law." 2
The Supreme Court in Texas Industries noted that the federal
courts could also formulate common law where there is "congressional
authorization to formulate substantive rules of decision.""" The Ex-
change Act, however, does not contain any provision conferring power
on the federal courts to fashion federal common law in securities
regulation."' In addition, because contribution is a separate substan-
tive right, it goes beyond the power of the federal courts to afford
appropriate relief under implied causes of action and enters an area
of lawmaking that is more suited for the legislature. 35 Because a claim
for contribution under section 10(b) does not fall within one of the
categories available for fashioning common law and because there is
no authorization by Congress allowing the courts to fashion federal
common law in securities regulation, the federal courts also lack the
common law power to create a right of contribution under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
The foregoing indicates that under the analysis adopted in North-
west Airlines and Texas Industries the federal courts do not have the
power to create a private right of action for contribution under section
10(b) and Rule 106-5, either through implication or federal common
law. Because the Supreme Court in Musick found Northwest Airlines and
Texas Industries distinguishable it declined to adopt the analysis in
those decisions and held that the federal courts do in fact have the
power to imply a right of contribution under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5."'" Accordingly, when it decided Musick, the Supreme Court, like
many earlier courts finding a right of contribution, ignored the inquir-
ies into congressional intent that guided the decisions in Northwest
Airlines and Texas Industries.
Instead, the Musick Court determined that such an inquiry would
be futile where the private cause of action under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 was itself implied by the federal courts and not expressly
"I See, e.g., Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 640; Northwest Airlines, 451. U.S. at 95.
"2 See Chutich, 960 F.2d at 724.
3" See Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 641.
"4 See Chutich, 960 F.2d at 724.
3" See id at 724.
"6 See Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2087-88, 2092.
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created or clearly implied by Congress. Under this analysis, however,
the inquiry into congressional intent in Northwest Airlines and Texas
Industries would be equally futile, because although Congress had
provided an express cause of action under the federal statutes in those
cases, it clearly did not create any right to contribution.'" If Congress
had expressly created a right to contribution under those statutes, it
would not have been necessary for the Court in Northwest Airlines and
Texas Industries to attempt to discern some intent by Congress that such
a right could be implied."' It appears, therefore, that the futility in
inquiring whether Congress intended to create a right to contribution
is no basis for distinguishing Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries. 3"
Thus, the Supreme Court in Musick erred by failing to apply the
analytical framework in those cases which, as noted earlier, is the
proper analysis in deciding whether the federal courts have the power
to imply a right of contribution under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 34°
Had the Supreme Court applied this analysis in Musick, it would have
determined that defendants in an action under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 do not have a right to contribution against others who are jointly
responsible for violating those provisions.
Although the Supreme Court in Musick expressly declined to rule
on the policy considerations underlying a right to contribution, the
Court asserted that its decision to uphold a right of contribution under
section 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5 is consistent with the majority of federal
courts that had previously considered the question." Many of these
federal courts, however, had recognized a right to contribution under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by primarily relying on these very policy
considerations."2 Moreover, the dissent in Musick pointed out that by
failing to resolve the threshold question of whether the federal courts
have the power to imply a right to contribution absent congressional
intent, the Court had joined the debate over the advantages and
disadvantages of contribution under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 34'
337 See Securities Litigation: Damages (CBC 1993 Supp.) § 13:08.190, at 176.
3" See id.
339 See id.
34° See Musick, 113 S. CL at 2094 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Chutich, 960 F.2d at 722-23; In re
Professional Fin. Management, 683 F. Supp. at 1285.
341 See Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2091.
m2 See, e.g.. Huddleston v. Herman & Maclean, 640 F.2c1 534, 559 (5th Cit., 1981); Hcizer
Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 332 (7th Cir. 1979); Globus, Inc. v. Law Res. Serv. Inc., 318 F. Supp.
955, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd per curiam, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir, 1971), cert. denied sub nom. Law
Res. Sera, Inc. v. Blair & Co., 404 U.S. 941 (1971).
543 See Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2095-96 (Thomas4, dissenting).
218	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 35:175
Some of the policy considerations adopted by the lower courts
prior to Musick have been questioned. The main policy consideration
put forth by those courts recognizing an implied right of contribution
is that such a right furthers the deterrent policies of the federal secu-
rities laws. The rationale is that contribution deters wrongdoers be-
cause it assures that culpable parties will be exposed to liability, not
just those parties whom the plaintiff in a section 10(b) action decides
to name. Other courts have called this reasoning into question, noting
that a no-contribution rule may be just as good or greater a deterrent
because a wrongdoer may be faced with having to bear the entire loss.
Moreover, allowing contribution under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
goes against the traditional common law rule denying contribution to
intentional tortfeasors because Rule 10b-5 requires scienier. In denying
the right to intentional tortfeasors, it has been reasoned that the courts
should not aid those who deliberately do harm.
Another policy consideration that the lower federal courts recog-
nizing a right to contribution have adopted is that allowing contribu-
tion promotes fairness. The rationale behind this policy is that contri-
bution creates a more equitable distribution of justice by apportioning
the loss among all culpable parties. Again, because of the scienter
requirement, section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 actions involve defendants
that have intentionally done wrong and it is not unfair to deny contri-
bution in such actions. 344 In addition, disallowing contribution, it has
been noted, may promote a rush of undesirable settlement, where
defendants can extricate themselves from litigation in exchange for
small settlement amounts. The counterargument to this is that allow-
ing contribution would discourage settlement, because a party to a suit
will be less inclined to settle if he or she must later face the prospect
of a contribution claim from another defendant.
Thus, there are conflicting arguments with respect to the policy
considerations surrounding a right of action for contribution under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. As the Supreme Court noted in both
Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries, such policy questions are for
Congress to resolve, not the courts. 5" The range of factors that must
be weighed in order to determine whether a right to contribution
should exist under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 indicates that it would
be inappropriate for the courts to consider such factors. 346 While the
Musick Court expressly declined to rule on policies underlying a right
344 In re Professional Fin. Management, 683 F. Supp. 1283, 1287 (D. Minn. 1988).
345 Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 98 n,41; Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 646-47.
346 See Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 646-47.
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to contribution, it cited to a great deal of lower court precedent that
had taken such policy considerations into account and noted that there
is no evidence that a right to contribution frustrates the purposes of
the federal securities laws."7
VII. CONCLUSION
In Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Insurance of Wausau, the
United States Supreme Court finally ended the uncertainty that existed
in the lower federal courts and held that the federal courts have the
power to imply a right of contribution under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-S. In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court in Musick refused
to apply the analytical framework for determining an implied right of
contribution that had been adopted in Northwest Airlines and Texas
Industries. Because a right to contribution is a separate substantive
right, rather than merely ancillary to the existing implied right of
action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, it appears that the Musick
Court erred in refusing to apply the analysis in Northwest Airlines and
Texas Industries. Had the Musick Court adopted the congressional
intent inquiry put forth in Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries, it
would have denied a right to contribution under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5.
By refusing to apply this analysis, the Musick Court failed to ad-
dress the threshold question of whether the federal courts have the
power to create such a right. Rather, the Musick Court found the power
to imply a right of contribution under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
because the private cause of action under these provisions was not
created by Congress, but was implied by the judiciary. The Court noted,
therefore, that the federal courts have the power to shape the contours
of that cause of action. Determining that a right of contribution is
within the contours of the implied private action under section 10(b)
and Rule 101)-5 and relying on sections 9 and 18 of the Exchange Act,
the Musick Court inferred that if the 1934 Congress had addressed the
issue it would have included a right of contribution. Consequently,
after twenty-five years, the issue is finally resolved and defendants in
an action under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and Rule 10b-5 have a right to seek contribution as a matter of federal
law.
CHRISTOPHER R. STONE
au See Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2091.
